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Abstract
Part I of this Article describes the congressional goals for the CIT in 1979 and 1980. Part II
focuses on the actual performance of the CIT with regard to one of those goals, speedy resolution
of antidumping and countervailing duty disputes. Furthermore, Part II documents the level of
delay during the four main phases of an initial CIT review of antidumping or countervailing duty
administrative determination. Part III examines the supplemental impact of CIT-ordered remands
on speedy resolution. Part IV briefly comments on the effect of appellate review of CIT decisions
on both speed and certainty in these actions. This Article concludes that more speed is needed in
CIT proceedings.
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GOALS FOR THE U.S. COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: MORE
SPEED! MORE SPEED!t
Leonard M. Shambon*
INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
(the "1979 Trade Act")I and the Customs Courts Act of 1980
(the "1980 Act"), judicial review of administrative decisions in
antidumping and countervailing duty cases has come to repre-
sent a very large portion of the overall activities of the U.S.
Court of International Trade (the "CIT"). In the three and
three-quarter years from January 1986 through September
1989, 46.3% of all CIT opinions resulted from antidumping
and countervailing duty litigation.' In light of the great impor-
tance for the CIT of this work, it is appropriate to examine the
success of the CIT in meeting the legislative goals for handling
these judicial reviews.
Part I of this Article describes the congressional goals for
the CIT in 1979 and 1980. Part II focuses on the actual per-
formance of the CIT with regard to one of those goals, speedy
t This Article is adapted from a paper submitted to the Sixth Annual Judicial
Conference of the U.S. Court of International Trade on November 3, 1989. The
views expressed in this Article are personal to the Author.
* Counsel, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C.; Director of the Of-
fice of Compliance, Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980-
1986. B.A. 1967, Yale University; J.D. 1972, University of Pennsylvania.
1. Codified at scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1988) [hereinafter 1979 Trade
Act].
2. Codified at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1988) [hereinafter 1980 Act].
3. The Court of International Trade (the "CIT") issued 601 slip opinions in the
period January 1986 through September 1989. Of those, 278 opinions were in an-
tidumping ("AD") or countervailing duty ("CVD") cases. The annual breakdown is
as follows:
Total AD/CVD AD/CVD As
Period Opinions Opinions Percent of Total
1986 142 50 35.2%
1987 146 67 45.9%
1988 177 91 51.4%
1989 (3 Qtrs.) 136 70 51.5%
TOTAL 601 278 46.3%
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resolution of antidumping and countervailing duty disputes.
Furthermore, Part II documents the level of delay during the
four main phases of an initial CIT review of an antidumping or
countervailing duty administrative determination. Part III ex-
amines the supplemental impact of CIT-ordered remands on
speedy resolution. Part IV briefly comments on the effect of
appellate review of CIT decisions on both speed and certainty
in these actions. This Article concludes that more speed is
needed in CIT proceedings.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
In 1979 and 1980, Congress set forth the legislative goals
for the CIT in the area of antidumping and countervailing duty
actions. These goals were: (1) judicial protection of the exten-
sive transparency and procedural rights needed, in Congress'
view, at the administrative level in order to control executive
branch discretion; (2) increased rights for domestic interested
parties to seek judicial redress; (3) uniform judicial review
through centralization of review in an expert judicial body, the
CIT, and its court of appeals, then the U.S. Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, now the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit; and (4) speedy resolution of judicial chal-
lenges through the elimination of de novo review.4
A. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
The legislative history of the 1979 Trade Act 5 contains a
number of concrete goals for revamping judicial review of an-
tidumping and countervailing duty determinations. 6 In addi-
tion to the clearly stated interest in increased transparency and
procedural rights and in greater opportunity for domestic in-
terested parties to seek judicial review, there was a congres-
sional interest in speed and uniformity of judicial decision-
making. The report of the Ways and Means Committee of the
U.S. House of Representatives (the "House Report")7 is the
most interesting piece of legislative history in this regard. The
4. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 179-81 (1979); S. REP. No. 96, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 245-52 (1979); S. REP. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1979);
H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, 28-30 (1980).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 2515 (1988).
6. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
7. Id.
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House Report pointed out that the legislation eliminated de
novo judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty
determinations because de novo review was "both time consum-
ing and duplicative." 8 De novo review was no longer needed
because the legislation increased access to information at the
administrative level and required the creation of a record for
appeal. 9 In place of the standards associated with de novo re-
view, the 1979 Trade Act provided for "a standard of review
whereby the administrative level determination is upheld un-
less unsupported by substantial evidence on the record."' 0
The House Report went on to say that:
A further advantage of requiring an evidentiary record
and review on that record would be the reduction in redun-
dant proceedings. Under present procedures, the import-
ers and foreign manufacturer/exporters, whose interests
are generally aligned, have three separate opportunities to
present their claim: first, when the foreign manufacturer/
exporter supplies Treasury, both during the fair value in-
vestigation and during the assessment phase, with home
market data; second, when the importer protests an assess-
ment of dumping duties; and third, when the importer seeks
de novo review in the Customs Court of a denial of his pro-
test. At each stage, new evidence may also be presented."
In addition to abolishing de novo review, the 1979 Trade
Act accelerated the judicial review procedure by permitting
any party with standing the right to challenge judicially an ad-
ministrative determination. The challenge was to be filed
within thirty days of notice of that determination. -Judicial re-
view no longer had to await liquidation, protest, and the two
years that the U.S. Customs Service might take to consider the
protest.' 2
B. The Customs Courts Act of 1980
The legislative history of the 1980 Act 1 3 echoes the con-
gressional themes found in the 1979 Trade Act. The report of
8. Id. at 181.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1988).
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the Senate Judiciary Committee' 4 accompanying the Customs
Courts Act of 1979 (the "1979 Act") 15 stressed among its pur-
poses the need for speed and uniformity of decision-making:
[C]larification of jurisdiction [consolidating jurisdiction
with the CIT and away from the district courts] will elimi-
nate the possibility of conflicting decision on any one point
of dispute. This, coupled with their current expertise In the
area, would enable the customs courts to render extremely
expeditious decisions in matters which are important to
both our country and to our trading partners.'
6
The consolidation would assure
our trading partners that administrative determinations in
this area will be subject to judicial review only by a limited
number of courts which are in a position to render expedi-
tious decisions. The clarification and expansion of the cus-
toms courts' jurisdiction is warranted not only because it
will eliminate the considerable jurisdictional confusion
which now exists, but because of two other important con-
siderations: considerations of judicial economy, and the
need to increase the availability ofjudicial review in the field
of international trade in a manner which results in uniform-
ity without sacrificing the expeditious resolution of import
related disputes.' 7
The report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S.
House of Representatives' 8 accompanying the House bill' 9
contained similar statements of purpose.
II. SPEED: FROM START TO FIRST DECISION
.ON THE MERITS
Part I of this Article enumerated four legislative goals.20
The legislation itself and the CIT's subsequent activities (in
concert with the activities of the U.S. Department of Com-
merce and the U.S. International Trade Commission (the
"ITC")) have since largely accomplished the first two. Cer-
14. S. REP. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
15. S. 1654, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
16. S. REP. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1979).
17. Id. at 4.
18. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1980).
19. H.R. 7540, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
20. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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tainly when compared with the pre-1980 era there is now sub-
stantial administrative transparency and procedural protection
in antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings for both
domestic and foreign parties affected by the actions of the De-
partment of Commerce and the ITC. With regard to the third
legislative goal, uniformity of judicial decisions, that goal was
largely met by making the CIT the exclusive jurisdiction for
initial judicial review. It is the fourth goal, speedy resolution
of actions, that has been least accomplished. The parties in-
volved are better off than in the era of protests and de novo
review, but review based on the administrative record, with its
substantial evidence standard for review, has fallen far short of
being speedy.
In order to evaluate the amount of time that the CIT takes
to dispose of a judicial challenge to an antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty administrative determination, this Article first
reviews the activities in the period leading to the CIT's initial
decision on the merits. This period (referred to in this Article
as Round One) encompasses all activity from the month of
commencement of the judicial review, by means of the filing of
the summons, through the month of the initial decision on the
merits, usually through a ruling on a Rule 56.1 motion. 21
At the end of Round One, there are two possible out-
comes: (1) a final dispositive decision on the merits, or (2) a
remand to the relevant administrative agency. If the judge
makes an initial decision to remand an action back to the rele-
vant administrative agency, Round One will be followed by
Round Two. Round Two encompasses the period from the
judge's remand order to the date of the judge's next decision
on the merits. Usually this decision affirms the remand results
or mandates a second remand. There have been a few in-
stances of actions involving a Round Three, initiated by a sec-
ond remand.22
Table 1 sets out each step in the Round One process with
the associated time permitted under the CIT's rules or cur-
rently assumed by observers of the CIT as reasonable for the
particular activity.23 Based upon the schedule in Table 1, the
21. See CT. INT'L TRADE R. 56.1, 28 U.S.C. app. (1988).
22. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing impact of remands).
23. See Table 1, reproduced in the Appendix to this Article.
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initial decision on the merits would occur 14.7 months after
commencement of the action, assuming both an oral argument
and post-hearing briefs.2 4 Even if actions were disposed of ac-
cording to this schedule, they would take too long. In fact, the
data shows that few cases meet the schedule described in Table
1.25
To learn the actual amount of time needed for Round
One, the Author measured its length in each of the 112 an-
tidumping and countervailing duty actions having Round One
decisions during the period January 1986 through September
1989.26 The median length of Round One during that 3.75-
year period was twenty-two months. 27 Table 2 contains a sum-
mary of the Round One dispositions that were made during
each year of the period, the median length of Round One for
each year and for the whole period, and the comparable mean
figures. Because the very long delays in several actions skew
the picture for all of the actions, particularly in 1988 and 1989,
the median figures are preferable to the mean values for use in
the analysis. In some of the actions, it has taken over five
years, and in one over eight years, for the initial disposition to
occur. 28 Having noted the preferability of the median figures,
it is also worth noting that the length of Round One varies
widely from one action to another.29 The median figures thus
can best be viewed as central tendencies rather than strong
predictors of the length of time that Round One takes.3 0
Using the median figure of twenty-two months for the full
24. If there were no oral argument, the scheduled day for decision would be Day
340, 11 months after commencement.
25. Compare Table I with Table 2, reproduced in the Appendix to this Article
(empirical data suggests schedule not being met).
26. See Table 2, reproduced in the Appendix to this Article.
27. See id. This figure was calculated by the Author. To arrive at these figures
the Author took the length of time for each decision and calculated a mean and a
standard deviation.
28. Several of these actions are beginning to look likeJarndyce andJarndyce:
Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of
time, become so complicated that no man alive knows what it means ...
Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young
people have married into it; innumerable old people have died out of it.
C. DICKENS, BLEAK HousE 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 1971).
29. See Tables 2 & 3, reproduced in the Appendix to this Article.
30. See Graphs 1-5, reproduced in the Appendix to this Article. The graphs list
the individual Round One dispositions by the CIT, and the length of time needed for
each disposition, for each year and the aggregate 3.75 years.
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3.75-year period, the time to first decision may be quite re-
spectable when compared with the time required for judicial
review by other federal courts of other types of administrative
actions. When compared with the legislative intent of the 1979
Trade Act and the 1980 Act, however, it is too slow. Legisla-
tive benchmarks in the 1979 Trade Act show a clear expecta-
tion of speedy resolution. For instance, the absolute maximum
time permitted by statute for an antidumping investigation is
fourteen months (420 days).3' The anticipated time for a sec-
tion 751 review32 is one year.33 It is difficult to believe, there-
fore, that the U.S. Congress, in providing for judicial review,
desired that the review process take almost two additional
years, at least 1.5 times the length of time for the underlying
administrative activity, before an initial judicial decision on the
merits would occur.-
Further, if the litigants wanted the Department of Com-
merce in the subsequent section 751 review to follow judicial
precedent emanating from earlier stages of the same adminis-
trative proceeding, the twenty-two months for Round One
would probably be too long for the Commerce Department to
do so. Because timely decisions are not made in Round One,
the result is multiple judicial challenges to the same Depart-
ment of Commerce practices. Indeed, the twenty-two month
figure demonstrates that the kind of situation seen in Fundicao
Tupy S.A. v. United States,34 OKI Electric Industry Company v. United
States,3 5 and other cases36 may occur frequently in the future.3 7
31. An ordinary antidumping investigation is to last a little over nine months
(280 days), and a countervailing duty investigation a little under seven months (205
days).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1988).
33. Cf id. § 1675(a)(1); H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1984).
While the text of the statute does not expressly mention one year as a specific time
frame, it is the Author's experience that one year is an implied standard.
34. 669 F. Supp. 437 (Ct. Int'l Trade), motion granted, 671 F. Supp. 27 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987).
35. 669 F. Supp. 480 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
36. See, e.g., Cambridge Lee Indus., Inc. v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 1518 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1989); cf. Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United
States, 704 F. Supp. 1114 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
37. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.22(a) & (e), 355.22(a) & (g) (1990). The deadline for
requesting a first section 751 administrative review is twelve months after the month
of the original antidumping or countervailing duty order. Id. If a party fails to ask
for a review, the Department of Commerce automatically assesses the affected entries
at the rate of cash deposit required at the time of entry of the merchandise. Id.
1990-1991]
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It may result in parties either seeking injunction of automatic
assessment, or alternatively being forced to undergo a section
751 review to keep their challenges to initial agency determina-
tions meaningful.
To identify the particular activities of Round One that
might cause the slippage, Round One can be divided into four
phases. Responsibility for Phase 1, from the filing of the com-
plaint to the filing of the administrative record, rests with the
agency whose action is the subject of judicial review. The
speed of Phase 2, from the filing of the administrative record
to the filing of the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the
agency record, is largely within the joint control of the plaintiff
and the defendant. It is, however, at this stage that the plaintiff
can lose control over the shape and speed of the litigation
through motions to intervene or motions to dismiss. Phase 3,
from the filing of the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the
record to either the filing of the last brief or the oral argument,
is controlled by the litigants. The judge obviously is responsi-
ble for Phase 4, the issuance of the decision.
To examine the contributions of each of these four phases
to the overall delay, the Author examined the docket sheets for
a sample of forty of the 112 actions with Round One decisions
during the January 1986-September 1989 period.3 The
length of Round One for each of these forty was within the
range of nineteen to twenty-five months, that is, within plus or
minus three months of the median value of twenty-two months
for all 112 actions. Table 3 sets out the actual experience in
each phase in the forty actions, using median values for each
phase. 9
As is evident in Table 3, Phase 1, which is scheduled in
Table 1 to take forty days, in actuality took two months.40
Phase 2, which is scheduled in Table 1 to take a little over four
months, in fact took six months.4 Phase 3, which is scheduled
38. See Table 3, reproduced in the Appendix to this Article.
39. Id.
40. Id. After review of all forty docket sheets, there appears to be no significant
problem with delays beyond the Table 1 schedule in the filing of the administrative
record by either the ITC or the Commerce Department. Most were filed in two or
three months. The Commerce Department does seem to have a habit of filing nu-
merous requests for short (usually two-week) extensions of time for filing the record,
which may create the impression of great delay.
41. Id.
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in Table 1 to take anywhere from two to five and a half months
depending on whether there is an oral argument, in fact took
seven months.42 Finally, Phase 4, where the benchmark is
three months, in fact took five months.43
In sum, all four phases contributed somewhat to the de-
lays past the benchmark schedule in Table 1. The bulk of the
delay was the result of the second, third, and fourth phases. 44
III. REMANDS: 'ROUNDS TWO AND THREE
The overall delay in Round One does not fully reflect the
CIT's failure to meet the legislative goal of speedy resolution
of the dispute. It is exacerbated by the time needed by the
agencies for further consideration during remands and the
time needed for judicial review of those remand results. As
can be seen in Table 4, the likelihood of one remand is signifi-
cant.43
In actions where Round One has ended with a remand,
the time from the month of remand to the month of (1) ap-
proval of the agency's remand results, (2) the vacating of the
remand order, or (3) an order for a second remand constitutes
a second round of activity. Table 5 describes the length of
time needed for Round Two during the three periods from
1986 through 1988.46 The median time for Round Two dur-
ing the three years was six months. Round Three assumes a
second remand. It begins with the month of the second re-
mand and ends with the month of approval of the additional
remand results. There are instances of Round Three ending
with either a settlement of the case or the ordering of a third
remand. Those decisions are also included in the analysis. Ta-
ble 6 describes the time needed for Round Three during the
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Table 4, reproduced in the Appendix to this Article.
46. See Table 5, reproduced in the Appendix to this Article. The Author has not
included the three quarters of 1989 because the median length of time for Round
Two for the first three years is longer than the period available for analysis of any
remand in most of 1989. Therefore, the three quarters of 1989 would have
presented a skewed picture of only those remands completed faster than the median
value.
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same three years.47 The median time for Round Three during
the three years was five months.
The median length of time for disposing of an initial re-
mand or even a second remand is not surprising. Not only do
the agencies regularly take sixty to ninety days to file their re-
mand results, the parties can then ask for the same protective
order access, briefing, and oral argument opportunities on the
remand results as they had with regard to the original Rule
56.1 motion. If the Round One decisions were occurring in
eleven to fifteen months, an additional six months for a re-
mand might be tolerable. Recognizing also that a remand can
involve as much work for the agency as the original decision
that was subject to judicial review, it is questionable whether
the full time allotted for judicial briefing and argument are re-
ally necessary in the limited context of reviewing a remand re-
sult.
Remanding itself is well-accepted as the appropriate judi-
cial response to an improper agency decision. 48 In the normal
course of events, the CIT, like all courts reviewing the actions
of administrative agencies, is expected to remand to the
47. See Table 6, reproduced in the Appendix to this Article. As with Round
Two, the Author has not analyzed 1989 remands. See supra note 46.
48. See, e.g., C.H. Kocu, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 8.7, 8.12 (1985).
The remand mechanism, however, has not been completely free of criticism. For
instance, in 1965, Professor Louis Jaffe wrote that
[tihe most usual form ofjudgment adverse to an agency is a remand "for
such proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion, as may be appropri-
ate." This is the form of remand where doctrine has been insufficiently for-
mulated or the findings are inadequate, where doctrine appears to have
been inconsistently or improperly applied, or (the largest category) where
an irrelevant element has been considered or a relevant element has been
neglected. In a number of famous cases the remand has achieved no more
than new rationalization for the same result. Is a remand thus futile because
the agency will adhere stubbornly to that which it has once willed? There is
no doubt that to some extent such an attitude is at work. I would suggest by
way of mitigation the hypothesis that when another case comes before it, the
agency will be more disposed to follow the judicial admonition. In other
words, the effectiveness ofjudicial supervision should be judged not only in
terms of the case in which the correction was administered, but in its effect
on doctrine in the long run. This is as I have said an hypothesis for investi-
gation. It would require a detailed examination of particular doctrines an-
nounced by the courts to determine the effect of a judicial correction on
subsequent administrative behavior.
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 589 (1965) (footnotes omit-
ted).
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agency in the event that the court does not find proper inter-
pretation of the law or substantial evidence to support the
agency decision. The frequency of remands, however, is
troubling.
The remand frequency may be attributable to several
causes. New statutory provisions adopted in 1979, 1984, and
1988 presented many purely legal issues to be resolved. Simi-
larly, in many instances the first application of the new legal
standards to factual situations deserved the CIT's oversight.
The much lower rate of remand in 1989 may indicate that the
administration of the antidumping and countervailing duty
laws is now settling down. Nonetheless, the statistics for likeli-
hood of remand should be carefully watched. A return to the
frequency of 1987 and 1988 would indicate a significant prob-
lem in the agencies' administration of the laws or in the CIT's
oversight review of the decisions of the agencies.4 9 In any
event, the CIT should ask itself whether a remand in an action
is truly necessary, and whether the basic outcome of the action
will be substantially improved through the deferral of the final
determination by one or more remands. The affected busi-
nessmen, the plaintiffs and intervenors, are not ordinarily in-
terested in whether the cash deposit rate should be twenty-five
percent rather than twenty-seven percent. They are not inter-
ested in perfection over certainty. Similarly, while the agencies
have no financial stake in the outcome, they have (or should
have) a strong interest in obtaining certainty in order to facili-
tate their administration of the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws.
IV. APPELLATE REVIEW
The U.S. Congress in enacting the 1979 Trade Act and the
1980 Act expressed a general concern about judicial review be-
ing repetitive and potentially inconsistent with prior U.S. Cus-
toms Service consideration. The legislation cured a significant
portion of the problem by switching away from de novo review,
thus eliminating one level of delay and conflict. At the same
49. Second remands may well be viewed as the result of insufficiently directed
first remands. Certainly, the private litigants (the plaintiffs and intervenors) are not
well served, and the resources of the Department of Commerce and the ITC are not
well spent if an action drags on through multiple remands.
1990-1991]
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time, the legislation did not address the peculiar structure for
judicial review of customs and international trade actions,
namely the existence of a two-tiered judicial review mechanism
that predates the 1979 Trade Act.5" The necessity for judicial
review by both the CIT and the Federal Circuit must be dispas-
sionately assessed. While the Author has not attempted to
measure the time added through appeals to the Federal Cir-
cuit, the potential for significant delay of final judicial disposi-
tions is obvious.
The two-tiered structure may also encourage the parties to
"forum shop."' 5' Realistically, the agencies may follow judicial
direction more quickly and more explicitly if additional oppor-
tunities for appeal did not exist. Further, a single court that
always sits in three-judge panels should be seriously consid-
ered. The agencies would then have no reason to believe that
there would be a "better" answer before another judge of the
same court.
CONCLUSION
During the past several years, there has been a significant
decline in the number of antidumping and countervailing duty
petitions filed by U.S. industry. In addition, parties havp in-
creasingly decided not to cooperate with the Commerce De-
partment in its data gathering and analysis. 5 2 There also have
50. Of course, the hypothetical review system has three tiers, but the third tier
(the U.S. Supreme Court) is not really relevant. For virtually all cases in this area, the
Supreme Court would most likely deny the writ of certiorari.
51. The agencies are unwilling to follow the instructions of a single CIT judge.
In a recent final results of review in Television Receivers from Japan, 54 Fed. Reg. 35,517,
35,519 (Aug. 28, 1989), for example, the Department of Commerce rejected Zenith
Electronics Corporation's request that the Department of Commerce implement the
CIT ruling in Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1382 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1986). Under the ruling, the Department of Commerce was to add indirect
taxes to the U.S. price only to the extent that they are passed through and included in
the price in the home market. The Department of Commerce stated that it did not
agree with the CIT but had not had the opportunity to appeal on the merits. 54 Fed.
Reg. 35,519, 35,520-21. In the same notice, Mitsubishi argued that the Commerce
Department should not deduct direct selling expenses from U.S. price but rather
should follow the CIT's ruling in Timken Co. v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 495, 506
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), and make a circumstance of sale adjustment to Foreign Market
Value for the difference. Id. The Department of Commerce commented that it dis-
agreed with the CIT ruling in Timken and was addressing the issue in a remand in that
case as well as litigating it in Zenith.
52. See, e.g., Commerce Department's Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair
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been frequent instances of private parties to an antidumping
or countervailing duty investigation, or to a section 751 review,
choosing not to exercise their rights to judicial review even
though their cases against the U.S. government may have been
strong.
There are good business explanations for the decline in
the use of, and participation in, antidumping and counter-
vailing duty proceedings. There is also, however, noticeable
disenchantment with the length of time and the expense in-
volved in these proceedings and with the lack of certainty at
the apparent end of the investigation or particular review. A
major contribution to the declining interest in these laws
comes from the prolonged period that it takes for judicial re-
view of agency action.5 3 In short, the basic legislative goal for
speedy and certain outcomes has not been accomplished.
It may be that the legislation was inherently flawed in its
attempts to reach speedy resolution because of its parallel ef-
forts to increase the accuracy of the determinations by the
agencies. Certainly the two agencies, particularly the Depart-
ment of Commerce, are under increasing pressure to simplify
their investigations. There are many voices, including the Au-
thor's, calling for a rougher form of justice at the administra-
tiveilevel in order to promote speedier as well as less costly
disposition. Similarly, the CIT could consider using a rougher
standard of justice in its judicial review activities.
Yet even without sacrificing the existing legislative goals
for precision, there should be a concerted effort to speed up
the process of judicial review. The CIT might well consider
publishing new benchmark time limits in the CIT rules. It is
the Author's view that the CIT should consider benchmarks
for Rule 16 scheduling of the review of protective order mate-
rial and for Rule 56.1 motions. Similarly, the briefing schedule
rules could be structured to minimize extensions of time. Sig-
nificant improvement will require cooperative reexamination by
all of the participants-the agencies, the CIT, and the private
Value: Certain Small Business Telephone Systems and Subassemblies Thereof From Japan, 54
Fed. Reg. 31,978, 31,979 (Aug. 3, 1989) (notifications of Toshiba and Matsushita
Corporations to Commerce Department that they were withdrawing from participa-
tion in investigation).
53. Also contributing to the decline is the uncertainty that the agency will follow
judicial directives even if the party prevails in its judicial challenge.
1990-19911
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litigants (i.e., the trade bar)-of their respective contributions
to the delays and uncertainties.
CIT LEGISLATIVE GOALS
APPENDIX
TABLE 1
STANDARD TIMES FROM SUMMONS
TO FIRST DECISION ON THE
MERITS
Day 0
(Phase 1) Day 30
Day 45
(Phase 2) Day 70
Day 90
Day 135
(Phase 3) Day 195
Day 230
Day 250
Day 275
(Phase 4)* Day 305
Day 335
Day 350
Day 440
- Summons is filed.
- Complaint is filed (CIT Rule 3(a)(2)).
- Action is assigned to a particular judge.
- Administrative record is filed (CIT Rule
7 1(a)).
- Answer to complaint is filed (CIT Rule
12(a)).
- Scheduling conference is held and
scheduling order is issued; protective
order materials are released.
- Motion for judgment on the agency
record is made (CIT Rule 56.1), after
review of protective order materials.
- Response briefs are due (CIT Rule
56.1(d)).
- Reply briefs are due (CIT Rule
56.1(d)).
- Order is issued granting oral argument.
- Oral argument occurs.
- Transcript is made available.
- Post-hearing briefs, if any, are due.
- Judge's opinion is issued.
* If there is no oral argument, then Phase 4 begins with the filing of the reply
briefs. If there is an oral argument and the judge permits post-argument briefing,
then Phase 4 begins with the filing of the last brief on the merits.
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TABLE 2
ANTIDUMPING & COUNTERVAILING DUTY
INITIAL DISPOSITIONS ON THE
MERITS (ROUND ONE)*
Period
1986
1987
1988
1989 (3 Qtrs.)
OVERALL
Number
Median Time
to Issuance
20 months
24 months
21 months
24 months
22 months
Mean Time
to Issuance
19.7 months
25.6 months
28.7 months
28.3 months
26.5 months
* The standard deviations and ranges for the four periods are as follows:
Standard Deviation
6.7 months
10.8 months
21.1 months
15.9 months
16.1 months
Range
7 - 31 months
10 - 52 months
2 - 98 months
9 - 64 months
2 - 98 months
For a normal (Gaussian) distribution, approximately two-thirds of the
observations fall within +/- one standard deviation of the mean, and
approximately ninety-five percent of the observations lie within +/- two
standard deviations.
Period
1986
1987
1988
1989 (3 Qtrs.)
OVERALL
CIT LEGISLATIVE GOALS
TABLE 3
LENGTH OF THE FOUR PHASES OF ROUND
ONE - 40 ACTIONS*
Median Median Median Me
Length Length Length Le
dian
ngth
Period Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
1986 2 months 8 months 3 months 6 months
1987 2 months 4 months 7 months 5 months
1988 2 months 7 months 9 months 3 months
1989 (3 Qtrs.) 3 months 4 months 5 months 8 months
OVERALL 2 months 6 months 7 months 5 months
* The number of actions analyzed were fairly well spread over the full 3.75-year
period:
1986 - 7 actions
1987 - 11 actions
1988 - 13 actions
1989 (3 Qtrs.) - 9 actions
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TABLE 4
LIKELIHOOD OF ONE REMAND
Period
1986
1987
1988
1989 (3 Qtrs.)
TOTAL
Number of
Remands Ordered
7
Total Number
of Decisions
17
29
39
27
112
TABLE 5
DISPOSITION OF INITIAL REMANDS
(ROUND TWO)
Median Months
to Issuance
6 months
8 months
5.5 months
6 months
Mean Months
to Issuance
9.4 months
8.9 months
7.5 months
8.4 months
TABLE 6
DISPOSITION OF SECOND REMANDS
(ROUND THREE)
Median Months
to Issuance
11 months
5 months
5 months
5 months
Mean Months
to Issuance
11.3 months
6.4 months
5.0 months
7.2 months
Likelihood
of Remand
41.2%
51.7%
59.0%
29.6%
47.3%
Period
1986
1987
1988
TOTAL
Number
Completed
11
15
20
46
Period
1986
1987
1988
TOTAL
Number
Completed
3
5
4
12
CIT LEGISLATIVE GOALS
GRAPH 1
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GRAPH 3
LENGTH OF TIME FOR CIT ROUND ONE DECISIONS
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GRAPH 5
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1986 AD/CVD CIT OPINIONS
CASE NAME CITATION
TIME TO INITIAL
DETERMINATION
((r) = remand)
1) Ansaldo
Componenti, S.p.A.
v. United States
2) Bingham & Taylor,
Div. Va. Indus. v.
United States
3) Philipp Bros. v.
United States
4) Kenda Rubber
Indus. Co. v.
United States
5) Kokusai Elec. Co. v.
United States
6) ICC Indus. v.
United States
7) Huffy Corp. v.
United States
8) Badger-Powhatan v.
United States
9) Zenith Elecs. Corp.
v. United States
10) Atlantic Steel Co. v.
United States
11) Ceramica
Regiomontana, S.A.
v. United States
12) Luciano Pisoni
Fabbrica Accessori
Insrumentali
Musicali v. United
States
13) Philipp Bros. v.
United States
628 F. Supp. 198
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
627 F. Supp. 793
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
630 F. Supp. 1317
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
630 F. Supp. 354
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
632 F. Supp. 23
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
632 F. Supp. 36
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
632 F. Supp. 50
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
633 F. Supp. 1364
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
633 F. Supp. 1382
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
636 F. Supp. 917
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
636 F. Supp. 961
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
640 F. Supp. 255
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
640 F. Supp. 1340
(Ct. int'l Trade
1986)
16 months
7 months (r)
22 months (r)
19 months
13 months
25 months
31 months
12 months (r)
10 months (r)
29 months
26 months
20 months (r)
18 months
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14) Chemical Prods.
Corp. v. United
States
15) Chemical Prods.
Corp. 'v. United
States
16) Lone Star Steel Co.
v. United States
17) American Permac,
Inc. v. United States
645 F. Supp. 289
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
650 F. Supp. 178
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
650 F. Supp. 183
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
656 F. Supp. 1228
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1986)
24 months (r)
24 months (r)
17 months
22 months
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1987 AD/CVD CIT OPINIONS
CASE NAME
1) PQCorp. v. United
States
2) USX Corp. v. U.S.
International Trade
Comm'n
3) East Chilliwack
Fruit Growers
Coop. v. United
States
4) Hyundai Pipe Co. v.
U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n
5) Atcor, Inc. v.
United States
6) Toho Titanium Co.
v. United States
7) Washington Red
Raspberry Comm'n
v. United States
8) PPG Indus. v.
United States
9) PPG Indus. v.
United States
10) Canadian Meat
Council v. United
States
11) Al Tech Specialty
Steel Corp. v.
United States
12) Yuasa-General
Battery Corp. v.
United States
CITATION
652 F. Supp. 724
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
655 F. Supp. 487
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
655 F. Supp. 499
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
670 F. Supp. 357
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
658 F. Supp. 295
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
657 F. Supp. 1280
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
657 F. Supp. 537
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
660 F. Supp. 965
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
662 F. Supp. 258
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
661 F. Supp. 622
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
661 F. Supp. 1206
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
661 F. Supp. 1214
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1987)
TIME TO INITIAL
DETERMINATION
((r) = remand)
25 months (r)
23 months (r)
19 months (r)
32 months
12 months (r)
26 months (r)
21 months (r)
26 months
38 months
20 months (r)
52 months (r)
25 months (r)
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1988 AD/CVD CIT OPINIONS
CASE NAME CITATION
TIME TO INITIAL
DETERMINATION
((r) = remand)
1) Fundicao Tupy S.A.
v. United States
2) Silver Reed Am.,
Inc. v. United States
3) Seattle Marine
Fishing Supply Co.
v. United States
4) Copperweld Corp.
v. United States
5) Keyes Fibre Co. v.
United States
6) Cementos
Guadalajara S.A. v.
United States
7) RSI (India) Pvt. v.
United States
8) Alhambra Foundry
Co. v. United States
9) IPSCO, Inc. v.
United States
10) IPSCO, Inc. v.
United States
11) Cementos Anahuac
del Golfo, S.A. v.
United States
12) Far East Mach. Co.
v. United States
13) Maverick Tube
Corp. v. United
States
14) Avesta AB v. United
States
678 F. Supp. 898
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
679 F. Supp. 12
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
679 F. Supp. 1119
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
682 F. Supp. 552
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
682 F. Supp. 583
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
686 F. Supp. 335
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
687 F. Supp. 605
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
685 F. Supp. 1252
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
687 F. Supp. 614
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
687 F. Supp. 633
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
687 F. Supp. 1558
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
688 F. Supp. 610
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
687 F. Supp. 1569
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
689 F. Supp. 1173
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
19 months
51 months (r)
51 months
23 months
31 months (r)
16 months
15 months (r)
24 months (r)
22 months (r)
23 months (r)
28 months (r)
16 months (r)
13 months (r)
32 months
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15) Algoma Steel Corp.
v. United States
16) Cementos Anahuac
del Golfo, S.A. v.
United States
17) Borlem, S.A. v.
United States
18) Fuji Elec. Co. v.
United States
19) Asociacion
Colombiana de
Exportadores de
Flores v. United
States
20) Cabot Corp. v.
United States
21) Asahi Chem. Ind. v.
United States
22) Gold Star Co. v.
United States
23) Sonco Steel Tube
Div., Ferrum, Inc. v.
United States
24) National Ass'n of
Mirror Mfrs. v.
United States
25) Floral Trade
Council of Davis,
Cal. v. United
States
26) Chaparral Steel Co.
v. United States
27) Monsanto Co. v.
United States
28) Monsanto Co. v.
United States
29) Timken States Co.
v. United States
688 F. Supp. 639
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
689 F. Supp. 1191
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
Slip Op. 88-77 (Ct.
Int'l Trade June 15,
1988)
689 F. Supp. 1217
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
693 F. Supp. 1165
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
694 F. Supp. 949
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
692 F. Supp. 1376
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
692 F. Supp. 1382
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
694 F. Supp. 959
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
696 F. Supp. 642
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
692 F. Supp. 1387
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
698 F. Supp. 254
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
698 F. Supp. 275
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
698 F. Supp. 285
(Ct, Int'l Trade
1988)
699 F. Supp. 300
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
23 months
18 months
12 months (r)
60 months
15 months (r)
22 months (r)
98 months (r)
20 months (r)
25 months (r)
16 months
2 months (r)
33 months (r)
21 months
17 months
.16 months (r)
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30) Floral Trade
Council of Davis,
Cal. v. United
States
31) Mitsubishi Elec.
Corp. v. United
States
32) Negev Phosphates,
Ltd. v. United
States
33) Companhia
Siderurgica Paulista,
S.A. v. United
States
34) American Permac,
Inc. v. United States
35) Floral Trade
Council of Davis,
Cal. v. United
States
36) Floral Trade
Council of Davis,
Cal. v. United
States
37) PPG Indus. v.
United States
38) PPG Indus. v.
United States
39) Citrosuco Paulista,
S.A. v. United
States
698 F. Supp. 925
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
700 F. Supp. 538
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
699 F. Supp. 938
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
700 F. Supp. 38
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
703 F. Supp. 97
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
704 F. Supp. 233
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
704 F. Supp. 241
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
702 F. Supp. 914
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
702 F. Supp. 917
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
704 F. Supp. 1075
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1988)
18 months
34 months (r)
14 months
21 months
47 months (r)
20 months (r)
19 months
89 months (r)
79 months (r)
18 months (r)
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JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1989 AD/CVD CIT
OPINIONS
CASE NAME CITATION
TIME TO INITIAL
DETERMINATION
((r) = remand)
1) Asociacion
Colombiana de
Exportadores de
Flores v. United
States
2) Florex v. United
States
3) NAR, S.p.A. v.
United States
4) NTN Bearing Corp.
of America v.
United States
5) Chinsung Indus.
Co. v. United States
6) U.H.F.C. Co. v.
United States
7) Olympic Adhesives,
Inc. v. United States
8) Hannibal Indus. v.
United States
9) Rhone Poulenc, Inc.
v. United States
10) Borlem S.A. -
Empreedimentos
Industriais v.
United States
11) Rhone Poulenc, Inc.
v. United States
12) Daewoo Elecs. Co.
v. United States
13) PPG Indus. v.
United States
704 F. Supp. 1114
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
705 F. Supp. 582
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
707 F. Supp. 553
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
705 F. Supp. 594
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
705 F. Supp. 598
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
706 F. Supp. 914
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
708 F. Supp. 344
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
710 F. Supp. 332
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
710 F. Supp. 341
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
710 F. Supp. 797
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
710 F. Supp. 348
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
721 F. Supp. 931
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
712 F. Supp. 195
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
21 months (r)
20 months
25 months
37 months
63 months
64 months
19 months (r)
12 months
21 months (r)
17 months
51 months (r)
27 months
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14) LMI - La Metalli
Industriale, S.p.A.
v. United States
15) Tai Yang Metal
Indus. Co. v.
United States
16) Sony Corp. of Am.
v. United States
17) Funai Elec. Co. v.
United States
18) Vitro Flex, S.A. v.
United States
19) Granges
Metallverken AB v.
United States
20) Ipsco, Inc. v.
United States
21) Bomont Indus. v.
United States
22) Wieland Werke, AG
v. United States
23) Marsuda-Rodgers
Int'l v. United
States
24) Floral Trade
Council of Davis,
Cal. v. United
States
25) Roses, Inc. v.
United States
26) AOC Int'l, Inc. v.
United States
27) Sandvik AB v.
United States
712 F. Supp. 959
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
712 F. Supp. 973
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
712 F. Supp. 978
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
713 F. Suppl 420
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
714 F. Supp. 1229
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
716 F. Supp. 17
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
715 F. Supp. 1104
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
718 F. Supp. 958
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
718 F. Supp. 50
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
719 F. Supp. 1092
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
716 F. Supp. 1580
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
720 F. Supp. 180
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
721 F. Supp. 314
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
721 F. Supp. 1322
(Ct. Int'l Trade
1989)
25 months
11 months
14 months
25 months
51 months (r)
26 months
13 months
37 months (r)
27 months
24 months (r)
9 months
58 months
32 months (r)
21 months
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